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Abstract
Alternative-based approaches to decision making generate overall values for each
option in a choice set by processing information within options before comparing options to
arrive at a decision. By contrast, attribute-based approaches compare attributes (such as
monetary cost and time delay to receipt of a reward) across options and use these attribute
comparisons to make a decision. Because they compare attributes, they may not use all
available information to make a choice, which categorizes many of them as heuristics. Choice
data have suggested that attribute-based models can better predict choice compared to
alternative-based models in some situations (e.g., when there are many options in the choice
set, when calculating an overall value for an option is too cognitively taxing). Process data
comparing alternative-based and attribute-based processing obtained from eye-tracking and
mouse-tracking technology support these findings. Data on attribute-based models thus align
with the notion of bounded rationality that people make use of heuristics to make good
decisions when under time pressure, informational constraints, and computational constraints.
Further study of attribute-based models and processing would enhance our understanding of
how individuals process information and make decisions.
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When sitting at your favorite café, you face the choice between a small cup of your
favorite beverage for $3.50 or a large cup for $3.75. Many of us would choose the large cup.
But how might we arrive at this choice? One method could generate a value for each option
by combining the amount of beverage received and the cost of that beverage (Figure 1). After
repeating this process for the second option, one could then compare the two options' values.
This is an example of alternative-based processing because information is primarily
processed within each alternative or option and options are processed in a sequential manner
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).
Another way to make the choice is to compare within attributes and across options.
Attribute-based processing primarily processes information within attributes or dimensions of
information used in choice. In the beverage example, the amount of beverage and cost are the
two relevant attributes. This method would compare the prices and may determine that they
are quite similar. However, the amounts are noticeably different, and you prefer more to less
beverage, so you choose the larger beverage (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Approaches to choice. Alternative-wise processing integrates attributes (in
this case, by applying some function f to the attributes) within alternatives to generate a
composite value. Attribute-wise processing compares attributes across alternatives using a
process such as similarity.
These two types of processing use the same information, but they use them in different
ways. Alternative-wise processing integrates within alternatives and considers options
sequentially, while attribute-wise processing compares within attributes and considers options
simultaneously. Though many models of choice do not explicitly define the decision-making
process, they typically imply either alternative- or attribute-wise processing.
Herbert Simon (1957) proposed the notion of bounded rationality, which states that
decision makers face constraints on information availability, time to make a decision, and
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computational abilities. Including all information or processing it in complicated ways may be
difficult for decision makers. Instead, they may use heuristics that ignore information and use
simpler computations to make the best possible choice given the constraints of their current
situation (Payne et al., 1993; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999; Selten,
2002). Models of choice include both optimization models that use all information and
combine it in complex ways, as well as heuristic models. Many alternative-based models of
decision making use all informational cues and combine them in a way to generate something
akin to a subjective value for each option. But many heuristics are attribute-based models.
Though there are exceptions in both directions, alternative-based approaches tend to use
optimization and attributed-based approaches tend to be heuristics. Here, we briefly review
alternative-based approaches to choice, then explore attribute-based approaches and what they
can offer the study of decision making.
Alternative-based choice
Alternative-based models are often compensatory because they make tradeoffs across
attributes: high values in low-weighted attributes can compensate for low values in highweighted attributes. Though alternative-based models can sometimes involve complex
calculations, these models can lead to sharper distinctions between choice options and thus
facilitate optimal decision making (Russo & Dosher, 1983). Thus, most normative models of
choice are alternative-based models. These models have been used to account for a range of
types of decisions, including multiattribute choice, risky choice, and intertemporal choice.
Multiattribute choice refers to situations in which decision makers must choose between
two or more options, and each option has values for a number of different attributes. For
example, one might choose between apartments that differ in their price, location, security
deposit, and amenities. A normative model of optimal multiattribute choice is the weighted
additive (WADD) rule (or weighted sum model) (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). WADD is
effectively a regression model that generates an overall value for each option in a choice set
based on attributes that are weighted by their importance to the decision maker (Payne et al.,
1993). The overall value for an option is determined by multiplying the value of each attribute
by that attribute’s weight and summing all of the weighted attribute values for that option. All
possible options are then compared and the option with the highest overall value is selected.
WADD, therefore, uses all available information, involves complex computational steps, and
requires a high degree of cognitive effort (Payne et al., 1993). The equal weight (EW) rule (or
Dawes’ rule) is a variation of WADD in which all attributes are equally weighted (Dawes,
1979), thereby simplifying the decision-making process (Payne et al., 1993). Satisficing is
another decision-making strategy that involves finding an option that satisfies a threshold or
set of thresholds (Simon, 1955). Decision makers first determine minimally acceptable
threshold values (or aspiration levels) for each attribute. Each option is then considered
sequentially by comparing the option's attribute values to their corresponding predetermined
thresholds. Options that contain any attributes that do not meet the thresholds are excluded
and the first option that contains attributes which satisfy all of the attribute thresholds is
selected (Payne et al., 1993). Though satisficing is considered a type of heuristic because it
does not necessarily assess all options, it uses alternative-wise processing by evaluating
options in the sequence in which they occur in the choice set.
Risky choice refers to situations in which options include different outcomes occurring
with different probabilities. For example, would you prefer a 100% chance of receiving $100
or a 50% chance of $200 and a 50% chance of $0? Researchers have proposed many models
of risky choice, and most of them are alternative-based approaches using a modification of
expected value. The expected value approach multiplies two attributes—the probability of an

Goh & Stevens: Attribute-based choice

4

outcome and the reward amount of that outcome—and sums these over all outcomes within
an option to generate an expected value (Pascal, 1654, as cited in Smith, 1984). Many other
models modify the expected value approach by applying a function to the probability and/or
outcome (e.g., expected utility, subjective utility, prospect theory; see Stott, 2006). The key
feature of these models is that each option is summarized into a value that is compared across
options.
Intertemporal choice refers to sets of options that differ in the reward amount and time
delay to receiving that reward. For example, would you prefer $100 today or $150 in one
year? Like risky choice models, most intertemporal choice models integrate two attributes to
generate a value for each option. For intertemporal choice, the attributes are reward amount
and the time delay to receiving the reward. Models of intertemporal choice apply different
functions to the reward amounts and time delays and different operations to combine them
(Doyle, 2013; Regenwetter et al., 2018). These operations have the effect of discounting the
value of the reward amount based on the time delay. These discounting models (e.g.,
exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, additive) generate discounted values for each
option and compare them to select the least discounted option.
Attribute-based choice
Attributed-based models have also been developed to account for multiattribute, risky,
and intertemporal choice. Many attribute-based models are non-compensatory because they
do not use all available information and therefore can avoid tradeoffs across attributes. Lowweighted attributes may be ignored and, therefore, cannot compensate for low values in highweighted attributes. Attribute-based models can also allow for intransitive preference cycles
in which option A is preferred to B, B is preferred to C, and C is preferred to A. Though
alternative-based models have gained the majority of interest in the field, research on
attribute-based models has grown. Here, we survey a subset of attribute-based models of
multiattribute, risky, and intertemporal choice.
Lexicographic heuristic
In the lexicographic heuristic, decision makers first decide on the attribute that is most
important to them. They then compare the values of that attribute across all choice options
before selecting the option with the highest value on that attribute. In instances where two
options have the same value on the most important attribute, individuals will have to compare
the options on the next most important attribute. This comparison process continues until one
option is deemed to be better than the other option on an attribute of importance (Fishburn,
1974). Several studies have found empirical support for the usage of the lexicographic
heuristic during decision making (Slovic, 1975; Tversky, Sattah, & Slovic, 1988; Kohli &
Jedidi, 2007; Yee, Dahan, Hauser, & Orlin, 2007). A variation of the lexicographic heuristic
is the lexicographic semi-order, where the ranking of each option's value on an attribute
depends on a just noticeable difference (Tversky, 1969). Specifically, if the values of options
fall within the just noticeable threshold for the target attribute, the attribute values of these
options will be ranked as equal and the decision maker will have to consider the next most
important attribute to break the tie.
Elimination-by-aspects heuristic
The elimination-by-aspects (EBA) heuristic combines the lexicographic heuristic with
the conjunctive rule. The conjunctive rule states that decision makers make a choice by
establishing minimally acceptable threshold values for attributes and then eliminating choice
options that do not meet these threshold values (Dawes, 1964; Einhorn, 1970). Similar to the
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lexicographic heuristic, decision makers using the EBA heuristic first select the attribute (or
aspect) that is most important to them. A threshold value for each attribute is then determined
and the value of each option on that attribute is compared to the threshold value. Choice
options that do not meet the threshold value for the attribute are eliminated and the process
continues with the next most important attribute until there is only one option that meets the
threshold values for all of the attributes (Tversky, 1972). Additionally, the EBA heuristic has
been suggested as a heuristic used by decision makers to reduce cognitive effort when they
have to make a decision from several choice options (Payne, 1976). The EBA heuristic is
considered to violate the principle of rational choice because the final decision is determined
by a single attribute. On the other hand, the EBA heuristic is also considered a rational
heuristic because it comprises the ranking of attributes in order of their importance (Tversky,
1972; Payne et al., 1993).
Proportional difference model
The proportional difference (PD) model was initially developed to predict decisionmaking behavior in a risky choice setting. The PD model posits that individuals compare the
values of options along the same attributes in a proportional manner (i.e., the monetary
outcome and probability of receiving that outcome of one option relative to those of the other
option). During this comparison process, individuals add the advantages and subtract the
disadvantages for each option to obtain an adjusted difference variable. To reach a decision,
individuals compare their difference variable to a decision threshold that reflects the
importance of each attribute (González-Vallejo, 2002). Such decision thresholds can vary
according to individual wealth status and the context of the situation (González-Vallejo, 2002;
González-Vallejo, Reid, & Schiltz, 2003; González-Vallejo & Reid, 2006). The PD model has
since been extended to the domain of intertemporal choice by replacing the probability
dimension with the time delay to receiving the monetary outcome (Cheng & GonzálezVallejo, 2016). In addition, the PD model accounts for the magnitude effect (where
individuals exhibit less discounting when values are larger), violations of stochastic
dominance (which states that when two options are similar on one attribute, individuals will
choose the option that is dominant on the differing attribute), transitivity of preferences,
reflection effect (which states that individuals are risk averse when they have to make a
choice among gains and risk seeking when they have to make a choice among losses), and
additivity (which holds that preference for a delayed option should be consistent regardless of
how the delay period is segmented) (González-Vallejo, 2002; González-Vallejo et al., 2003;
González-Vallejo & Reid, 2006; Cheng & González-Vallejo, 2016).
Tradeoff model
The tradeoff model proposes that individuals choose from options by weighing the
advantage of the monetary outcome of one option against the advantage of the time value of
the other option in intertemporal choice (Scholten & Read, 2010). The tradeoff model thus
also suggests that time can be converted to the same scale of measurement used for monetary
outcome (Scholten, Read, & Sanborn, 2014). The tradeoff model accounts for the magnitude
effect, common difference effect (the tendency for individuals to exhibit more discounting
when a delay period begins sooner compared to later), violations of transitivity of preferences,
additivity, and inseparability (which states that individuals consider the value of the time
delay of an option based on the value of that option's monetary outcome). In contrast to the
PD model which uses the absolute monetary and time delay values of options to carry out
comparisons between two options, the tradeoff model includes additional parameters that
calculate value- and time-weighing functions that capture individuals' subjective perceptions
of monetary values and time delays respectively (Scholten & Read, 2010; Cheng & González-
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Vallejo, 2016). Despite the use of a more complex formula to predict choice, the ability of the
tradeoff model to predict intertemporal choice is similar to that of the PD model (Cheng &
González-Vallejo, 2016).
Difference-ratio-interest-finance-time (DRIFT) model
The difference-ratio-interest-finance-time (DRIFT) model suggests that decisions in
intertemporal choice are affected by how choice options are framed. Specifically, the
weighted average of the absolute difference between monetary values, relative difference
between monetary values, experimental interest rate offered, and extent to which individuals
view the experimenter's offer as an investment rather than a consumption are balanced against
the importance assigned to time (Read, Frederick, & Scholten, 2013). Read and colleagues
(2013) found in their analysis of the DRIFT model that the framing of monetary outcomes as
investments increased individuals' patience for small monetary values ($700) but reduced
patience for large monetary values ($70,000), which suggests that the manner in which
intertemporal choices are framed affects decision-making behavior. The DRIFT model can
account for the magnitude effect and delay effect (which states that individuals discount less
when the time delay is described in a calendar date format instead of units of delay) when the
difference and ratio between monetary values and the experimental interest rates are varied
(Read et al., 2013).
Intertemporal choice heuristic (ITCH) model
The intertemporal choice heuristic (ITCH) model makes use of arithmetic operations
to predict choice. Individuals compare available options by first subtracting and dividing
option values along their respective monetary and time dimensions to obtain absolute and
relative differences. Weights that reflect the level of importance assigned to these dimensions
are then added to each of the four variables and their sum calculated to arrive at a decision
(Ericson, White, Laibson, & Cohen, 2015).
Although the ITCH model is similar to the DRIFT model, the two models differ in that
the ITCH model calculates both absolute and relative differences in time delay whereas the
DRIFT model calculates only absolute differences (Ericson et al., 2015). The ITCH model
accounts for the property of additivity and the magnitude, common difference, and delay
effects.
Similarity model
The similarity model was initially developed to study decision making in a risky
choice setting (Rubinstein, 1988; Leland, 1994). Rubinstein (1988) suggested that individuals
who have to make a decision between two lottery options will do so by comparing the
similarity of monetary outcomes and similarity of probability of receiving those outcomes for
both options. The similarity model has also been extended to the strategic choice domain
where it suggests that individuals make a decision by comparing the similarity of payoff
options (Leland, 2013) and to the intertemporal choice domain where it posits that individuals
arrive at a decision by comparing the similarity of monetary outcomes and time delays of
choice options (Leland, 2002; Rubinstein, 2003; Stevens, 2016).
In the domain of intertemporal choice, the version of the similarity model developed
by Leland (2002) suggests that individuals compare the similarity of monetary outcomes and
similarity of time delays for options. These similarity comparisons can then result in one of
three decision consequences: (1) a choice is made because one option dominates the other
option on one attribute but has similar values on the other attribute, (2) the choice between the
two options is inconclusive because both options offer similar values on the monetary and
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time delay attributes, or (3) the choice between the two options is inconsequential because one
option dominates the other option on one attribute but is dominated on the other attribute.
When a decision is either inconclusive or inconsequential, Leland (2002) proposed that
individuals will proceed to make a choice at random, whereas Rubinstein (2003) suggested
that a choice must be made using another (unspecified) criterion.
Stevens (2016) added a second stage of existing discounting models if similarity
analysis was inconclusive or inconsequential. The two-stage similarity models predicted
individual choice better than Leland's (2002) similarity model and other discounting models
alone. Finally, the similarity model accounts for the magnitude, reflection, and common
difference effects, violations of stochastic dominance, and transitivity of preferences (Leland,
1994, 1998, 2002; Stevens, 2016).
Fuzzy-trace theory
Fuzzy-trace theory posits that individuals encode information presented to them in
both verbatim and gist representations (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995, 2011). Verbatim
representations refer to the exact remembrance of information, such as remembering a note
word-for-word or the exact digits of a telephone number. On the other hand, gist
representations refer to memory for the general meaning of concepts, such as one's principles
or cultural norms (Reyna & Brainerd, 2011; Reyna, 2012). Several studies have shown that
individuals tend to rely on gist compared to verbatim representations when they have to make
decisions and that individuals prefer to make use of the simplest gist level (or categorical
distinctions) whenever possible (Reyna & Farley, 2006; Reyna & Lloyd, 2006; Reyna et al.,
2011; Reyna & Brainerd, 2011).
Fuzzy-trace theory suggests that decisions made in risky choice and intertemporal
choice settings depend on the gist, or core, principles evoked based on the context of the
situation. The evoked gist principles then make one option more salient than the other,
resulting in a decision. When specifically applied to the context of intertemporal choice, the
evoked gist principles will make either the smaller-sooner option or the larger-later option
more salient which will in turn affect the intertemporal choice made (Reyna, 2012; RahimiGolkhandan, Garavito, Reyna-Brainerd, & Reyna, 2017; Reyna & Wilhelms, 2017). For
example, an individual presented with a choice of either receiving $5 today or $7 in 3 days
may think of these options in the gist representations of "receiving some money today" and
"receiving some money later" respectively. According to fuzzy-trace theory, if this individual
possesses a gist principle akin to "living in the moment", his gist principle would make the
option to receive $5 today more attractive than the other option, resulting in him choosing the
smaller-sooner option. Fuzzy-trace theory can thus be considered an attribute-based model
since it compares choice options across attributes.
Process data
While many researchers have compared alternative-based and attribute-based models in
terms of their ability to accurately predict choice, the two classes of models also provide an
important distinction in the process of choice—that is, the cognitive steps required to make a
choice. Therefore, it can be useful to investigate process data to explore these models,
particularly data that reveal how decision makers acquire information. Researchers have used
eye tracking and mouse tracking to measure information acquisition with respect to
alternative- or attribute-based information processing (Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Kühberger, &
Ranyard, 2010).
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Eye tracking
Eye-tracking techniques monitor how individuals attend to different types of
information (Duchowski, 2017). As individuals look at visual stimuli, an eye tracker records
the direction and path of eye movements, thus allowing researchers insight into which
information individuals consider to be important (Figure 2). In the first use of eye tracking to
study the decision-making process, Russo and Rosen (1975) studied how individuals chose in
a multialternative choice setting. The researchers concluded that participants compared the
options presented to them in pairs and preferred to use options that were similar to one
another to form these pairs whenever they could. In a similar vein, Russo and Dosher (1983)
found that participants preferred to compare options along attributes in a multiattribute choice
setting. Participants also made use of attribute-wise comparisons in gambles that were
expected to follow an expected value rule where the expected monetary outcome and
probability of receiving that outcome are combined to calculate an overall value for each
option. These eye-tracking studies thus support an attribute-based decision-making process.
Arieli, Ben-Ami, and Rubinstein (2011) used a risky choice task to investigate
whether individuals used an alternative-based or similarity-based approach to make decisions.
They hypothesized that participants who used an alternative-based approach when evaluating
lottery options would move their eyes within options because they were formulating an
overall value for each option (Figure 1). On the other hand, participants who used a similaritybased approach would move their eyes within attributes because they were comparing the
options along each attribute (i.e., monetary outcome and probability).

Figure 2: Example eye-tracking screenshot. Eye trackers record the direction and path
of eye movements when individuals view information presented on a screen.
Arieli and colleagues (2011) found that participants used attribute-based processing to
make decisions in a risky choice setting when the values of the monetary outcomes and
probabilities made the calculation of the overall value of each option using the alternativebased process difficult. A follow-up study conducted by Aimone, Ball, and King-Casas
(2016) supported Arieli et al.'s (2011) finding and also found that attribute-based processing
was associated with risk-aversive choice preferences. Further, Arieli et al. (2011) found that
participants maintained attribute-based processing to make a decision when the context of the
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lottery options was changed from risky choice (i.e., with the dimensions being monetary
outcome and probability of receiving the monetary outcome) to intertemporal choice (i.e.,
with the dimensions being monetary outcome and time delay of monetary outcome).
Mouse tracking
Mouselab is a computer program that allows researchers to monitor how individuals
acquire information in the decision-making process by using a computer mouse as a tracking
tool (Johnson, Payne, Bettman, & Schkade, 1989; Willemsen & Johnson, 2009). The
information for each attribute for all options in the choice set is presented in a matrix in which
the cells are covered by overlays. When individuals hover their mouse over a cell of the
matrix, the overlay disappears to reveal the underlying information; when the mouse moves
out of the cell, the overlay reappears and covers the information again (Figure 3). Mouselab
also records the amount of time that individuals spend viewing each "opened" section, the
order in which sections are viewed and the number of times each section is viewed, thus
allowing researchers to ascertain the importance of each attribute to individuals during the
decision-making process.

Figure 3: Recreated screenshot of MouselabWEB. Individuals move their mouse over
each section of the matrix to display information for each option that is hidden by the overlay.
The overlay reappears—and the information disappears again—when the mouse is moved out
of the section.

In a comparison of the Mouselab and eye-tracking process-tracing techniques, Lohse
and Johnson (1996) found that for both techniques, participants used attribute-based
processing when the number of options in a choice set was increased in both risky choice and
multiattribute choice settings. By contrast, participants used alternative-based processing
when the number of attributes for each option in the choice set was increased (Lohse &
Johnson, 1996). Reeck, Wall, and Johnson (2017) used Mouselab and eye tracking to study
variations in search strategies in an intertemporal choice setting. They found that participants
who used an attribute-based search strategy to compare options had a higher tendency to
choose the larger-later option and were more susceptible to option-framing effects compared

Goh & Stevens: Attribute-based choice

10

to participants who used an alternative-based search strategy. Additionally, they found that
participants who spent more time looking at the amount dimension compared to time
dimension of options were more patient as they chose the larger-later option more often than
other participants in the study. In a study that combined risky and intertemporal choices,
Konstantinidis, van Ravenzwaaij, and Newell (2017) used a computer program similar to
Mouselab to study individuals' decision making in risky intertemporal choice. Participants in
their study had to choose between two lottery options that differed in the dimensions of
monetary outcome, probability of receiving the monetary outcome, and delay to receiving the
monetary outcome. Process data demonstrated that participants preferred to use an attributebased approach over an alternative-based approach when making their decisions.
Research using eye tracking and mouse tracking has further elucidated our
understanding of how individuals acquire and process information when making decisions.
Evidence from process data has shown that individuals make use of both alternative-based
and attribute-based models of choice processing, and that the choice strategy that they use
depends on the context of the situation at hand.

Conclusion
While the study of decision making has historically focused on alternative-based
models, attribute-based models have experienced a resurgence of interest from researchers for
a number of reasons. First, they follow from Simon’s notion of bounded rationality because
they often reflect real-world limitations faced by decision makers by using less information
and simpler computations. This is especially pertinent in instances where decision makers
have to make a choice from myriad options or when there is risk involved in the decisionmaking process. Second, they capture choice data quite well, predicting multiattribute, risky,
intertemporal, and strategic choices while accounting for, or bypassing, anomalies regularly
encountered in the use of alternative-based models. Third, in addition to capturing choice
data, attribute-based models can capture the decision process by making predictions about eye
tracking and information acquisition data. Combined, these lines of evidence suggest that
attribute-based models provide a fruitful class of decision-making models that warrant
continued investigation.
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